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Harrington, 1995; Strain, 1991; Weiss, 1991; Meyer,
1995; Fink, 1995; Mulhall, 1997; Stephen, 1998; CSI,
1999; Ernst & Young, 2000). For example, Mulhall
(1997) states that 41% of computer systems in the U.S.
were subjected to various computer abuses in 1996. The
Computer Security Institute (1999) reports that 51% of
organizations responded on a survey experienced
financial loss by computer abuse that approximate $124
million in 1999, and the figure is expected to rise
continuously. Amid this growing problem, previous
studies have investigated the issue of why computer abuse
has not been reduced despite companies’ increasing
investment in computer security, have attempted to find
ways to reduce computer abuse.
They usually agree on the three main causes:
inappropriate enforcement and operation of a security
policy, ill-suited security standards in system
development/purchasing and operations, and a relatively
low level of interest and awareness of organizational
members in computer abuse. As a solution to these
problems, the studies have recommended that
organizations implement security awareness programs
(Crockett, 1998; Fites and Kartz, 1993; Smith, 1993;
Stephen, 1998; Ulsch, 2000; Wood, 1994; Zajac, 1988).
For example, Ulsch (2000) recommends security
awareness programs as the most effective tool to
overcome the lack of concern about computer security
within top management. Smith (1993) emphasized the
importance of a security awareness program, mentioning
that "raising awareness and educating a wide audience in
the basics of computer security will achieve, pound for
pound, a far more profound and longer lasting
improvement in computer security than any purely
technical solution could ever hope to achieve"(p. 237).
Although previous studies have suggested practical
ways to conduct security awareness programs, such as
training courses accompanied by publications, posters,
newsletters, bulletins, trinkets with a security message,
and security regulation statements (Fites and Kartz, 1993;
Meyer, 1995; Smith, 1993; Wood, 1991; Zajac, 1988),
these approaches have some limitations in providing users
with useful and timely security awareness and knowledge.
First, such programs focus only on managers, excluding
operational-level employees who also account for a large
portion of computer abuse (e.g, Hoffer, 1989; Rose and

Abstract
Even though organizations have developed and
implemented a number of security countermeasures,
computer abuse continues to be a problem, and
information systems in organizations today remain in
jeopardy. Researchers recommend security awareness
programs as a means to increase security interest and
knowledge, but this has not provided satisfactory results.
In this paper, we introduce the concept of security
knowledge management systems (SKMS). These systems
overcome time and place limitations, consider different
levels of security knowledge among users, promote
voluntary participation, and provide a positive framework
for learning security knowledge. SKMS gives users a
way to overcome the limitations of traditional awareness
programs through the ability to acquire the most current,
diversified security knowledge, to search the knowledge
more quickly and accurately, to store it more securely, to
share it conveniently, and to maintain it cost effectively.
As a result, SKMS allows users to acquire better security
knowledge, while giving organizations a cost-effective
way of reducing computer abuse.

Background
Despite the fact that organizations have developed and
implemented a number of security countermeasures,
computer abuse has continued to be a problem (Meyer,
1995; Straub and Welke, 1998; Timothy and John, 1999).
Moreover, the frequency of computer abuse and its
amount of loss are expected to grow as computer abuse
occurs at the hands of highly sophisticated and educated
criminals armed with the latest information technology
(Baskerville, 1993; Straub and Nance, 1990). Computer
abuse can be defined as “any intentional act associated in
any way with computers where a victim suffered, or could
have suffered, a loss, and a perpetrator made, or could
have made again"(Parker, 1981:333). It includes all
crimes against hardware, programs, data, and computer
services (Kling, 1980; Hoffer and Straub, 1989; Lee, et
al., 1986; Straub, 1990). There are many cases that reveal
how critically organizations are victimized by computer
abuse (ABA, 1984; Straub, 1986; Hoffer and Straub,
1989; BloomBecker, 1989; Goodhue and Straub, 1991;
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consulting co., secure system vendors, or research
organizations), and content-based search engines. One of
the main differences between SKMS and conventional
security awareness programs is that by using SKMS
organizational members can play more active roles in
generating security knowledge.

Tom, 1989; Wood, 1991). Second, these programs have
been, at best, sporadic efforts, not leading to regular,
routine security related activities in organizations. As a
result, the useful, just-in-time security knowledge has not
been made available to organizational members. Third,
such programs do not consider different levels of
employee security knowledge, limiting the effectiveness
of education.
Finally, the compulsory nature of
traditional security awareness programs has made
participatory security knowledge sharing difficult (Rose
and Tom, 1989; Straub and Welke, 1998; Parker, 1998).
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce a
conceptual model of a new type of system called security
knowledge management systems (SKMS), aimed at
addressing the problems mentioned above. An SKMS is a
type of hybrid system that combines the concept of an
escalation path of human security experts with that of
knowledge management systems. Both concepts have
proven their value in real world settings by their ability to
promote greater user satisfaction, increased interest, and
efficient knowledge management (El Sawy and Bowles,
1997; Buckman, 1998). By introducing these benefits,
SKMS can support organizational members through more
efficient acquisition, searching, and sharing of security
information.

Figure 1. The Framework of SKMS

Research Model

While not all knowledge is generated by users, the
concept of user participation in security knowledge
creation is important since many researchers report that
the IT department does not often have enough information
about computer abuse in the real operational world (e.g.,
Wood, 1991; Parker, 1998). Since users are the people
who experience the risk of day-to-day computer abuse,
they often know how to apply appropriate
countermeasures. Organizational IT experts can also
generate security knowledge. There are numerous IT
experts within the organization who have special
knowledge for solving specific security problems. To
draw out employees’ and IT experts' tacit knowledge,
SKMS requires them to develop their own homepages.
These homepages should contain information about their
own expert knowledge along with references to experts
whom they know. This concept is currently being utilized
in BP AMOCO (Newing, 2000). Additionally, security
managers play a key role in creating security knowledge.
They develop this knowledge through their own expert
knowledge, from outside security experts (e.g., security
counselor, security product vendors, and specialized
security organizations such as CERT), and from a variety
of documents from security journals and hacker's Internet
sites.
Security knowledge can also be acquired using
bulletin board systems (BBS) from the SKMS homepage,
as well as content-based search engines and collaborative
filtering methods. Users can suggest security solutions
using the BBS, while a content-based search engine
automatically collects multimedia files related to

The SKMS model, shown in Figure 1, consists of four
main system modules: knowledge acquisition, knowledge
search, knowledge storage and knowledge sharing. We
divide the system into four modules, according to the
general classification of knowledge management systems
(e.g., Choo, 1998; Nonaka and Tachuchi, 1995). An
organization can operate SKMS under its normal network
environment, including its intranet, or using the Internet.
SKMS is supported by several information technologies,
such as a web-based graphical user interface (GUI) and a
trusted security knowledge base (web server), as shown in
Figure 1. As mentioned above, it is also characterized by
a leveled escalation path of security managers. This
concept is adopted from consumer support systems (e.g.,
help desk) that are widely used in the service industry
(e.g., El Sawy and Bowles, 1997). An important aspect of
SKMS involves its ability to motivate organizational
members to learn more about security and to apply
effective security principles. We discuss the vital issue of
motivation in a subsequent section of the paper. In this
section, we first discuss each of the SKMS modules in the
following sections. Secondly, we discuss the issue of
implementing SKMS in the organization by integrating it
with traditional security awareness programs.

Knowledge Acquisition Module
Security knowledge is generated from three sources:
organizational members (i.e., users, IT experts, and
security managers), outside sources (e.g., security
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resource to further refine its contents and the searching
mechanism. The Knowledge search module is shown in
Figure 3.

computer security. A search engine can help in gathering
Internet-based security information that includes audio,
video, and text (Chang et al., 1999). Using an intelligent
filtering algorithm, users can gather only the information
they want. Collaborative filtering methods can reduce the
burden on security managers for reading unnecessary
information gathered by content-based search engines
(Avery and Zeckhauser, 1997). Security managers update
the security knowledge base after collecting all of the
information and then verifying its appropriateness through
communication with other security experts. Figure 2
shows the SKMS knowledge acquisition mechanism.

Figure 3. Knowledge Search and Storage Modules

Figure 2. Knowledge Acquisition Module

Knowledge Storage Module
We store security knowledge on the web server in the
form of documents that include multimedia data such as
text, video, and voice. We refer to this web server as the
"security knowledge base". In the security knowledge
base, 6 kinds of security knowledge are stored (as shown
in Figure 3).
They are: security problem-solution
documents, leveled security educational materials, general
security solutions, knowledge map, organizational
security policy, and the information about current security
systems.
The organizational security policy document includes
the organizational security policy, procedures, and records
of previous punishment. We include this document in the
knowledge base for two reasons. One is to give the user
information related to the organization’s security policy.
The other is to show potential computer abusers that the
organization is serious about monitoring and controlling
computer abuse. The information about security systems
within the organization includes a document describing
the system's security functions, operating techniques,
audit records, and know-how accumulated over time.
Problem solution documents suggest the appropriate
solutions to computer security matters. General security
solutions include security tools such as vaccine programs,
recent security accident reports, and the newest security
newsletters.
Security education materials contain the leveled
security knowledge. We develop these materials based on
well-known security documents published by professional
security organizations (e.g., NIST, RSA, SRI
International, ISO, BSI) and by well-known experts (e.g.
Pfleeger, 1995, Wood, 1994). We classify these materials
in three ways. One is by the level of expertise, the second
is by the contents covered in each area, and the third is by

Knowledge Search Module
The second module in SKMS is the knowledge search
module. Organizational members can search security
knowledge using two search methods: a human security
expert-based search and a knowledge search engine. The
expert-based search method has its origins in help desk
systems that utilize “escalating paths” of helpers (see Fig.
1). In such systems, helpers are usually divided into two
or three levels, according to their work and scope of
responsibility (i.e., the higher the level, the greater the
responsibility and security knowledge). This approach
has proven to have many benefits to users, such as
qualified service, quick response, and increased
satisfaction. It also gives each security expert the chance
to concentrate on his/her own sub-domain of expertise
and to increase specific knowledge on the problems that
are frequently requested.
As mentioned above, users can also access a security
knowledge base using context-based search engines.
Users' access to certain documents can be logged, and
based on the statistics, the security department can find
the most frequently occurring problems in the
organization. User feedback on the materials accessed
from the knowledge base can also be an important
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shows the secure knowledge sharing mechanism in
SKMS.

user type (i.e., manager versus non-managerial employee.
For example, we divide the contents of the materials into
10 sub-topics: Risk Management, Physical Security,
Cryptography, Application Security, Operating System
Security, Database Security, Network Security,
Administrative Security, Policy and Ethics on Security,
and Business Continuity Planning.
The security knowledge base contains critical
resources that must be protected by highly trusted security
measures. Since access by insiders or malicious outsiders
can cause a major disaster, we consider measures to
assure the integrity, confidentiality and availability of the
security knowledge base. To assure the integrity, only the
top-level security manager is allowed to modify the
knowledge base. To assure the confidentiality, we suggest
multilevel security systems that give users limited access
rights. For example, when user tries to access SKMS
outside the company, firewall first checks out his access
right and then SKMS checks again his password and user
name. Finally, to insure continuous availability, the
knowledge base is implemented as a fault-tolerant system
that endures in emergency situations.

Figure 4. Secure Knowledge Sharing Module

Motivational Factor

Knowledge Sharing Module

SKMS includes motivational factors in its scope. Its
importance was supported by several studies (e.g., Parker,
1998) positing that traditional awareness programs
experienced the failure since they did not or less
implement
motivational
factors
for
attracting
organizational members. We include three main
motivational factors into this model. First, SKMS
includes several kinds of rewards such as incentives,
bonus or fame, or fast promotion into its scope, which
were not well supported by the traditional security
awareness programs. As showing organizational members
the highly positive correlation between the levels of
interest and knowledge about a computer security and the
organizational success, SKMS can motivate them.
Secondly, SKMS provides them more user friendly GUI,
fast and exact search engines, learning materials based on
the levels of security or IT knowledge, and give
diversified access channels to overcome space and time
limitation. For example, it is possible to develop SKMS
website as the useful and playfulness site that
encompasses a lot of interesting information that is related
to not only computer security, but also other issues, such
as finance, sports, weather, and news site. It can induce
the employee to visit SKMS website and help to mitigate
the negative sight to computer security. The last is to
encourage organizational members to a supportive and
positive organizational culture on computer security. It
can only be possible with continuous higher interest from
top management.

SKMS performs its knowledge sharing functions under an
IT organizational infrastructure such as a groupware
platform or an intranet. Specially, SKMS has two sharing
support modules: the BBS and the knowledge map. The
BBS, managed by security personnel, includes newly
updated security information, users’ security suggestions,
and recent punishment reports. Users can make
suggestions using the BBS without fear that their
comments will be accessed by anyone outside the
organization. However, when a user thinks the suggestion
is very critical to their organization's security, he/she can
submit it directly to security managers for their feedback.
The knowledge map functions like yellow pages. It maps
specific problem domains to appropriate experts who
have solutions. Users can then communicate with these
experts using e-mail to get the necessary information.
This map also increases the opportunity for users to
access and share solutions among themselves, with a tutor
or the designated security manager, through several
communication media. Through this tutorship, users can
learn about security knowledge more easily, and at the
same time, security managers can learn more about the
day-to-day operational situation in the organization. For
sharing knowledge securely, the implementation of a
trusted network is prerequisite. This includes secure
network architecture for assuring continuous operation
and includes user authentication, encryption, and access
control systems. For example, when a user wants to
access the security knowledge base from outside the
organization, a firewall should screen the request to
determine if that user has access privileges. Figure 4
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develop a stronger intention to access SKMS and increase
their security awareness and knowledge. As is shown in
Figure 5, these benefits from SKMS contribute on the
reduction of computer abuse by helping organizational
members enforce and operate the security policy,
optimally allocating their limited budgets in developing or
operating security systems, and increasing their interest in
computer security.

Potential Implication
In this research, we suggest SKMS as an effective
approach for promoting organizational security
awareness. SKMS comprises both a security awareness
program and security knowledge enhancement methods.
It encompasses both managers and non-managerial
employees, overcomes time and place limitations, and
provides multi-level educational materials. It also gives
users diversified, up-to-date security knowledge using a
variety of acquisition mechanisms, and provides fast,
exact search results using various search mechanisms.
Additionally, it provides users with a convenient
knowledge sharing method using a bulletin board system
and knowledge maps, based on an attractive GUI that
promotes ease-of-use.
In the context of a supportive organizational culture,
SKMS can help motivate users to learn security
knowledge. By implementing SKMS, security managers
can lessen their burden and use their slack time to focus
on security enhancement in their organizations. With
these features, SKMS can promote organizational
members’ interest in and knowledge of computer security
and provide a more cost effective way to cope with
computer abusers, compared to conventional security
awareness programs. Table 1 shows a comparison
between traditional security awareness programs and
SKMS.

Figure 5. The Potential Effects of SKMS

Object

Increase
Awareness

Subject of the program

Manager

Knowledge Level
Time and Distance
User Participation
Viewpoint to Security
Burden of Security
Department
Quality of Shared
Security Knowledge
Volumes of Knowledge
Timeliness
Variety of knowledge
Knowledge Sharing
Organizational Culture
Security

Not Consider
Fixed
Passive
Negative

Increase Awareness
& Knowledge
Manager
&Employee
Consider
Flexible
Relatively Active
Relatively Positive

Heavy

Relatively light

In order for the implementation of SKMS to succeed,
however, it is necessary to combine this new approach
with traditional security awareness programs. The
organization and organizational members need time to
become familiar with the new system. To do this, an
optimal strategy is to operate both traditional programs
and SKMS simultaneously during the system introduction
period. After having time to learn about and become
accustomed into SKMS, organizational members can
more easily adapt to this system. Organizations can
consider integration SKMS with security outsourcing
which provides more elaborated and newest security
knowledge by outside security consulting company as a
SKMS implementation alternative. Figure 6 shows the
implementation strategy for SKMS.

Low

High

Figure 6. The Implementation Strategy of SKMS

Small
No (Slow)
Fixed
Inefficient
Compulsive
Less Secure

Large
Yes (Fast)
Variable
Efficient
Supportive
More Secure

Table 1. Potential Comparison Between Traditional
Security Awareness Programs and SKMS
SUBJECT

TRADITIONAL

SKMS

A key feature of SKMS is that it provides a number of
motivational benefits to the organization, which can be
explained based on the theory of planned behavior (TBP)
(Ajzen, 1991). The theory suggests that the intention of
behavior depends on the attitude, subjective norms, and
perceived behavior control factors of the actor. Based on
TBP, we can assume that if organizational members have
a positive attitude, along with an environment that
promotes learning and knowledge sharing, they will
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Limitation
We have suggested a conceptual model of SKMS that we
believe organizations can use as an effective tool in their
fight against computer abuse. However, currently, a
major limitation is that the model has not yet been
implemented in any organization. We are in the process
of developing a prototype SKMS, which we plan to test it
empirically in our future studies.

Conclusion
SKMS provides organizational members with several
effective and efficient components to support acquiring,
storing, searching, and sharing security knowledge. By
using the system, organizational members can choose
security knowledge according to their interest, level of
knowledge, and work domains -- whenever, whatever,
and wherever they desire. This promotes a positive
attitude and greater ease in learning security knowledge.
All of these benefits can help to enhance the
organization’s ability to fight computer abuse by
enforcing and operating the appropriate security policy,
incorporating security measures in the development of
new systems, sharing security knowledge more
efficiently, and identifying effective security solutions,
and then contribute to a dramatic reduction of computer
abuse.
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